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RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR: A CLARIFICATION AND
BROADENING OF THE CURRENT "SCOPE OF
EMPLOYMENT" TEST
I. INTRODUCTION
How would you respond to the following situation? An ex-
tremely upset client comes into your office. She has just learned that
her child was molested by his day care teacher. There is no real
question of guilt because another day care center employee observed
the molestation. In addition to the criminal charges which have al-
ready been filed, your client would like to pursue a civil action
against the tortious teacher individually and against the day care
center under the doctrine of respondeat superior.'
If you determined that the client did not have any realistic
chance of success under respondeat'superior, you would be in agree-
ment with the majority of California courts.2 However, the issue has
yielded contradictory results in the past decade. As a result, if you
answered that your hypothetical client did have a case under the re-
spondeat superior doctrine, at least one California court' would
agree with you, and, possibly, the Supreme Court of California. The
California Supreme Court granted review of three appellate court
cases which concern defining the parameters of the scope of employ-
ment in regard to the doctrine of respondeat superior. The court
handed down a decision in the first4 and remanded the second for an
opinion consistent with the first.5 However, it has yet to decide the
© 1990 by Christine W. Young.
1. A concise definition of respondeat superior is "[liet the master answer." It means that
in certain cases a master is held liable for the wrongful acts of his servant. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979).
2. See, e.g., Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 200 Cal. App. 3d 758, 246 Cal. Rptr. 487,
rev,. granted sub nor. Miller v. City of Los Angeles, - Cal. 3d __ , 756 P.2d 1348, 249
Cal. Rptr. 289 (1988) (reprinted for tracking pending review 213 Cal. App. 3d 1464); Jeffrey
E. v. Central Baptist Church, 197 Cal. App. 3d 718, 243 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1988); Rita M. v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1986); Alma W. v.
Oakland Unified School Dist., 123 Cal. App. 3d 133, 176 Cal. Rptr 287 (1981).
3. White v. County of Orange, 166 Cal. App. 3d 566, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1985).
4. John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 194 Cal. App. 3d 454, 240 Cal. Rptr. 319
(1987) (reprinted for tracking pending review 206 Cal. App. 3d 1473), modified, 48 Cal. 3d
438, 769 P.2d 948, 256 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1989).
5. Kimberly M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 196 Cal. App. 3d 1506, 242 Cal.
Rptr. 612 (1987), rev,. granted, - Cal. 3d __, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905, 750 P.2d 786 (1988)
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third.'
The problem is one of consistency. California courts have been
interpreting the scope of employment in different ways which, in
turn, produce different rulings in cases with very similar fact
patterns.
This Comment first presents an historical background on the
doctrine of respondeat superior including the current treatment of
the scope of employment. Second, an analysis of the two-prong scope
of employment test and the manner in which courts have applied it
is presented. The analysis also discusses the policy rationales used to
justify respondeat superior. Finally, this Comment makes a proposal
for an amendment to the two-prong scope of employment test. The
proposed change will add clarity and predictability to a test whose
vagueness results in a very inconsistent and unpredictable applica-
tion of the respondeat superior doctrine.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Origins of the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior
Historically, the concept of respondeat superior existed in the
notion of responsibility for harmful results, and was based mainly on
primitive superstition.7 Liability was found to exist for both negli-
gent and intentional acts. Some of the situations in which liability
was imputed included: the individual was the actor of the resulting
harmful act; he was the owner of an instrument which caused harm;
or he was the owner of an animal or slave which caused the harm.'
In cases of the imposition of absolute liability on the master
despite the fact that the master did not command the act, there was
an emphasis on finding a visible source of responsibility for the re-
sulting harm.9 This ancient law was most often applied in a master-
slave situation to make the master absolutely liable for the acts of his
(reprinted for tracking pending review 209 Cal. App. 3d 1326), transf later op., 215 Cal.
App. 3d 545, 263 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1989).
6. Mar ' M., 200 Cal. App. 3d at 758, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
7. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARv. L. REV. 315, 317
(1894).
8. Id. Other instances in which liability was imputed were where an employer was
strictly liable to relatives of an employee whose death was caused by his business; a judge was
responsible for a mistaken judgment despite the fact he had acted in good faith; and a person
who, even unknowingly, harbored or assisted a wrongdoer was guilty by virtue of associating
himself with the evil of the wrongdoer. However, no liability was imputed where there was an
unlawful intent, but no unlawful result. Id. at 317-18.
9. Id.
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slaves."0 However, this absolute liability disappeared after the Con-
quest, at the same time as common slavery in England.1
Liability based on a master's direct enlistment or procurement
of the tortious act existed continuously from the earliest of times to
present day. 2 However, where vicarious liability was sought against
a master who did not procure or command the commission of the
tort, the result was less clear.
By the 16th century, broad notions of master liability had al-
ready disappeared. The only instance in which a master was respon-
sible for the torts of his servant was when he had actually ordered
the commission of the tortious act.1" As the 17th century approached,
the realities of a growing commerce and industry warranted a broad-
ening of this narrow rule.1"
Thus, the basic principle of our current modern rule developed.
The master or employer was held liable for that tortious conduct of
his servant or employee which was determined to be on the master's
behalf or in the course of the servant's employment.1" Since the act
was determined to be within the course of employment, the rule was
justified by viewing the conduct as done under the general command
of the master. 6 This remained the rule as English law in the area
developed.
B. English Law
The first case under English law where this broader principle
was applied was in Hern v. Nichols.'7 In this case, a silk merchant
was held liable for the fraud committed by his agent in the sale of
10. W. WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 321 (2d ed. 1932).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 320-21.
13. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 500 (5th ed. 1984).
14. W. WALSH, supra note 10, at 322. The narrow rule requiring that the master give
a specific command in order to impute liability was justified by the immediate control the
master had over his servants. With the great expansion of commercial life and the subsequent
need for entrusting servants with broader responsibility, this justification no longer truly ex-
isted and business demanded that the master be held liable for the acts of his representatives.
Id.
15. Id. at 322-23.
16. Id. Walsh quoted the commentator Blackstone who summed up the development of
the rule: "In the same manner whatever a servant is permitted to do in the usual course of his
business, is equivalent to a general command. The reason of this is still uniform and the
same-that the wrong done by the servant is looked upon in law as the wrong of the master
himself." Id. (footnote omitted) See WIGMORE, supra note 7, at 394-402 for a description of
the cases and decisions exemplifying development of this rule.
17. 90 Eng. Rep. 1154 (1709) (opinion written by Chief Justice Holt).
1990]
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goods. The court noted that if someone was to "lose" or suffer due to
the agent's deceit, it was better that the person who employed the
agent and put his trust and confidence in him suffer rather than the
stranger who was defrauded.
An analysis of the case by the well-known commentator Baty
noted the contractual nature between the merchant and agent in
Hern.1 The merchant had invited others to put their trust and con-
fidence in his agent in order to make contracts with the merchant. 9
Therefore, he should expect to be responsible for any contracts made
by his agent, including those entered into as a result of the agent's
deceit and fraud." However, as Baty noted, this case was decided on
a contract as well as a tort basis. 1 The rule followed during this
time period was explained by Holdsworth:22 the servant himself was
liable for any unlawful act he committed under the command or
consent of his master, even if the act was committed while in the
course of employment. However, if the servant committed a lawful
act under the command or consent of his master, the master was then
liable for any resulting harm." In other words, the employer was
held responsible for those wrongful torts committed by his employee,
so long as the acts were committed within the scope of employment.
The scope of employment was interpreted in the most narrow sense
here. It was on this basis that the American law developed.
C. American Adoption of English Law Principles
Wright v. Wilcox24 is a leading American case from the 19th
century that followed this broad principle of liability for acts within
the scope of employment. Wilcox, a wagon driver, was delivering
goods for his employer when some boys attempted to board his mov-
ing wagon. Wilcox cracked his whip to cause his horses to go faster
in order to prevent the boys from climbing aboard. As a result, one
of the boys, the plaintiff, fell underneath a wagon wheel and suffered
severe injuries."
18. See T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 10 (1916).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 384 (5th ed. 1942). Holds-
worth noted that although generally the ancient doctrines tended to operate strictly in the area
of civil liability, there was a tendency for this severity to diminish in regard to the master's
liability for the acts of his servants. Id.
23. Id. Generally, the laws for civil liability paralleled those for criminal liability. Id.
24. 19 Wend. 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
25. Id.
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Although the court departed from the rule of the day and stated
that a master was generally liable for a servant's negligent or incom-
petent actions,2 the holding did not follow this principle. Rather, the
court found that the tort in this case was intentional and, therefore,
explicitly chose to follow established precedent and hold that the
master was not liable for the willful tortious conduct of his servant.27
It was determined that to impose liability on the master in cases, like
the one at bar, which involved a willful tort, there must be an ex-
press assent by the master for the servant's tort. "[Tlhe law will not
imply assent. '"28
The Wright court even went so far as to explicitly reject the
policy argument that is presently accepted for respondeat superior.
That argument is as follows: between two innocent persons, it is bet-
ter that the employer of the tortfeasor pay for resulting harm rather
than the innocent, injured third-party plaintiff.29 Therefore, the
wagon driver's employer was not found liable for the tortious con-
duct of his servant.
D. Development of California Law
1. Early Broadening of the Scope
California courts initially followed the principles set forth in
Wright above."0 Employers were not found liable for the intentional
torts of their employees. These wrongful acts were, by definition,
26. "[Wihen a servant does an act injurious to another, through negligence or want of
skill, [the master's liability is based] on the principle that the master should at his peril employ
servants who are skilful [sic] or careful." Id. at 346 (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 345. Although the servant may be engaged in a service for the master, the
master is not liable for the servant's willful misconduct. A master is only responsible for those
acts within the servant's scope of agency. See M'Manus v. Crickett, 102 Eng. Rep. 43 (1800)
(master not liable where servant willfully drove carriage into another without master's direc-
tion or assent, but would have been liable had the servant acted negligently or unskillfully);
Browcher v. Noidstrom, 127 Eng. Rep. 954 (1809) (captain of ship not liable where crew
member cut away at another ship's sail to disentangle the two ships and captain did not direct
the act); Croft v. Alison, 106 Eng. Rep. 1052 (1821) (servant negligently whipped horses
causing collision with plaintiffs and, therefore, master is liable; different result where servant
wantonly does same thing); all of .which the court cited in support of this proposition.
28. Wright, 19 Wend. at 346.
29. Id. The Wright court simply found that this argument proves too much and would
result in holding "the master accountable for every mischievous act of the servant." Id.
30. See, e.g., Wade v. Thayer, 40 Cal. 578 (1871) (employer not liable for assault com-
mitted by employees in removing trespasser from premises because employees' actions consti-
tuted a wanton, malicious, and unprovoked assault); Andrews v. Runyon, 65 Cal. 629, 4 P.
669 (1884) (one who employs another to repair levee not responsible for the illegal removal of
dirt from the highway where the necessity of removing dirt could not be inferred from the
contract which the employer bound himself to).
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outside the scope of employment. However, it was not long before
California departed from strict adherence to this rule.
Otis Elevator Co. v. First National Bank"' is an early example
of this departure. In Otis, the plaintiff's employee forged a check and
fraudulently received the amount due from the defendant bank. Al-
though normally a bank pays on forged checks at its own risk of
possible loss, the court in Otis found the plaintiff, holder of the ac-
count, responsible for the loss.3" The routine manner in which
checks were normally paid out to the employee was emphasized and,
ultimately, the wrongful, fraudulent conduct of the employee was
imputed to the employer."3
The Otis court stated that an employer's liability for both the
negligent and intentional torts committed by an employee, either "in
or as part of the transaction of such business," is a general principal
of law.3' It was not claimed that the employee acted in furtherance
of the employer's business or under his authority in committing the
particular act of forgery.3" Rather, the court based its decision on the
general proposition that the employer holds out the employee as ca-
pable and trustworthy. Accordingly, the employer must be held lia-
ble when the employee fails to act consistent with these characteris-
tics.36 The matter in Otis was found to be within the scope of
employment. Thus, liability was imputed to the employer, due to the
fact that this particular employee was the individual who routinely
cashed the checks in the normal course of business.
The court in Ruppe v. City of Los Angeles17 also found the
employer liable for an intentional tort committed by its employee. A
city employee in Ruppe was assigned to wire a building and set the
meters in order to provide electricity to the building. The plaintiff,
31. 163 Cal. 31, 124 P. 704 (1912).
32. Id. at 31-34, 38, 124 P. at 705, 707. The general rule is applied strictly in cases of
simple forgery, but it is modified when some negligence on the part of the customer contributes
to payment by the bank or other facts are present which demand a different, more equitable
remedy. Id. at 38, 124 P. at 707.
33. Id. at 39-40, 124 P. at 707-08.
34. Id. at 39, 124 P. at 707. The court reasoned that the application of respondeat
superior is required in order to ensure the safety of third parties when dealing with either the
principals or their agents. Id.
35. Id. at 40, 124 P. at 708. The Otis court recognized the fact that the employee was
not acting within the scope of his authority to cash only valid checks. However, as far as the
bank was concerned, the employee was acting within the direct scope and course of his em-
ployment which consisted of preparing and presenting checks for his employer. Id.
36. Id. at 39, 124 P. at 707. In effect, by holding the employee out as such, the em-
ployer "warrants his fidelity and good conduct in all matters within the scope of his agency."
Id. (citation omitted).
37. 186.Cal. 400, 199 P. 496 (1921).
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who was in charge of the building in a capacity similar to that of a
caretaker, refused to let the employee enter the building at the advice
of her employer. 8 Subsequently, the city employee forced his way
into the building and assaulted the plaintiff in an effort to do the
work assigned to him.
Although the city employee's actions were determined to be
clearly contrary to the express instructions of his employer, the court
determined it was immaterial whether the assault had been expressly
authorized by the city. 9 Rather, the court stressed that the act was
done in the course of employment. The court found that in such
situations the master is responsible although the act is unauthorized
or even contradictory to express orders.4
In dicta, the Ruppe court acknowledged that no employer liabil-
ity would be imputed under respondeat superior where the employee
had completely "step[ped] aside from his employment."4 However,
the act could still be determined as within the scope of employment
even where it was malicious or willful. 42
In the case at bar, the court did not premise the employer's
liability on any notion of authorization, but rather on the fact that
the employer had "empowered . . . [the employee] . . . in the sense
that he ha[d] entrusted him with the performance of a duty in whose
performance it [was] possible for him to break the law.""' This idea
of empowerment is one that recurs throughout this Comment.
2. The 1930's: Period of Strict Interpretation of "Scope"
Following the above period of expansive interpretation of the
scope of employment, California courts refrained from a further
broadening of the scope. This strict interpretation can be seen in two
38. Id. at 401, 199 P. at 496.
39. Id. at 402, 199 P. at 496. The court reasoned that the act was committed by the
employee "in the course of doing that which he had been sent to the building by the city to do,
and in furtherance of its doing." Id. This constituted an act done in the course of employment.
Id.
40. Id. Citing Otis Elevator Co. v. First National Bank, 163 Cal. 31, 124 P. 704
(1912), the court stated that acts of an employee done on behalf of the employer are the same
as if they were done by the employer himself. Any question of authority in regard to the
particular act is irrelevant. Id. See also Johnson v. Monson, 183 Cal. 149, 190 P. 635 (1920)
(saloon owner liable for bartender's assault of patron due to bartender's general authority to
maintain order in saloon).
41. Ruppe, 186 Cal. at 402, 199 P. at 496.
42. Id. at 402, 199 P. at 497. If done in furtherance of the purpose of the employee's
employment, the act will be found within the scope of employment, regardless of whether it is
intentional, and the employer will be liable. Id.
43. Id. at 403, 199 P. at 497.
1990]
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leading decisions from the 1930's." These decisions resulted in find-
ings that the employees' intentional torts were independent acts,
outside the scope of employment. 5
The employee in Yates v. Taft Lodge No. 152746 was hired by
the defendant lodge to collect admission fees and control admission of
the general public at a benefit picnic. When the employee refused
admission to some hired musicians who should have lawfully been
admitted, the plaintiff landlord and the employee became involved in
a dispute. The employee subsequently assaulted the plaintiff."7
The Yates court initially acknowledged the general rule of em-
ployer liability for an intentional tort committed by an employee act-
ing within the scope of employment. 4'8 However, the court further
noted that where the employee departs from the employer's business,
no liability is imputed under the respondeat superior doctrine. 49 The
authority this particular employee had been vested with in Yates ex-
tended only to taking admission fees and controlling crowd admis-
sions. The force he used against the plaintiff was unrelated to this
authority and the duty he was obligated to fulfill."0 The tort was
committed as a result of a dispute over the contract or concession
situation, which was not one of the employee's duties. Thus, the use
of force in connection with this ancillary problem could not be found
within the scope of employment.51
An equally strict line was drawn in Lane v. Safeway Stores
Inc.,52 where a store clerk's "roughhousing" with a boy resulted in
an alleged assault and injuries to the boy. The court found the em-
ployee was hired to perform only sales functions for the store. Thus,
roughhousing with the boy had a purpose independent from the em-
ployment."8 Because this was the employee's own independent pur-
44. Yates v. Taft Lodge No. 1527, 6 Cal. App. 2d 389, 44 P.2d 409 (1935); Lane v.
Safeway Stores Inc., 33 Cal. App. 2d 169, 91 P.2d 160 (1939).
45. 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 138 (9th ed. 1987).
46. 6 Cal. App. 2d 389, 44 P.2d 409 (1935).
47. Id. at 390, 44 P.2d at 409-10.
48. Id. at 390, 44 P.2d at 410. The court also recognized the difficulty in applying the
settled general rule to the facts of a particular case. Id. at 391, 44 P.2d at 410 (citing Stephen-
son v. Southern Pac. Co., 93 Cal. 558, 29 P. 234 (1892); Rahmel v. Lehndorff, 142 Cal. 681,
76 P. 659 (1904)).
49. Yates, 6 Cal. App. 2d at 390, 44 P.2d at 410. Once the employee departs from the
employer's business, the employee is held to have his own independent purpose. Id.
50. Id. at 391, 44 P.2d at 410. The plaintiff was already on the grounds. Therefore, the
employee did not commit the act in relation to his duty of controlling admissions . Id.
51. Id. at 391-92, 44 P.2d at 410.
52. 33 Cal. App. 2d 169, 91 P.2d 160 (1939).
53. Id. at 173, 91 P.2d at 162.
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pose, the employer was not held liable."4
3. Carr and Its Progeny
The 1940's brought increased liability for the employer under
respondeat superior. The California Supreme Court addressed the
issue twice in less than one year. The result was two leading cases
on the respondeat superior doctrine: Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co."
and Fields v. Sanders." Both cases involved assaults by employees
while they were engaged in their employment.
In Carr, the tortfeasing employee worked for a general contrac-
tor and the plaintiff was employed by a subcontractor on a large
construction job. The employee and plaintiff became embroiled in a
dispute over the correct.procedure for laying the floor of a building.
The general contractor's employee threw a hammer at the plaintiff
which struck him in the head and resulted in serious injuries.57
The Carr court found that the assault was an outgrowth of the
employment." The risk of such an "emotional flare-up" was to be
expected in those situations which require people to work together.59
Since this foreseeable risk arose out of the employment, it was just to
hold the employer liable for the resulting injury.6° However, the
court noted that if an employee inflicts an injury due to personal
malice, not originating from the employment, the employer is not
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior."1
Thus evolved the two-prong analysis for the respondeat supe-
rior scope of employment that is still used by courts today. It is im-
portant to note that satisfaction of only one of the two prongs is
sufficient to impose vicarious liability. The first prong analyzes
54. Id. The requisite employer-employee relationship did not exist in regard to the
roughhousing due to the independent purpose. Therefore, where no such relationship existed,
the employer could not be held liable under respondeat superior. Id. (citing Stephenson v.
Southern Pac. Co., 93 Cal. 558, 563, 29 P. 234, 235 (1892)).
55. 28 Cal. 2d 652, 171 P.2d 5 (1946).
56. 29 Cal. 2d 834, 180 P.2d 684 (1947).
57. Carr, 28 Cal. 2d at 653, 171 P.2d at 6.
58. Id. at 656, 171 P.2d at 8.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 656, 171 P.2d at 7-8. The court reasoned that "[m]en do not discard their
personal qualities when they go to work." Id. at 656, 171 P.2d at 7. While employees bring
their "good" personal attributes such as intelligence and skill, they also bring "bad" ones such
as a tendency to be careless or a tendency towards emotional flare-ups. The risks that go along
with these characteristics are inseparable from working together and are risks inherent in the
working environment. Id. at 656, 171 P.2d at 7-8.
61. Id. at 656, 171 P.2d at 8 (citing Yates v. Taft Lodge, 6 Cal. App. 2d 389, 390, 44
P.2d 409 (1935) (other citations omitted)).
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whether the act was done on behalf of the employer or can be deter-
mined as incidental to the employee's duties. In Carr, the court
found neither part of this first prong was satisfied.6 2
The second prong addresses the question of whether the action
taken by the employee in Fields was foreseeable in light of his duties
to the employer. As explained above, in Carr, this resulted in the
employer's liability under respondeat superior because of the foresee-
ability that an emotional flare-up might arise out of the work
situation.6
The facts in Fields v. Sanders are similar to those in Carr to
the extent that an assault resulted directly from an employee's per-
formance of his duties. The employee worked as a truck driver for
the defendant company. He and the plaintiff became involved in an
altercation that arose when the employee allegedly ran the plaintiff
off the road. The employee was in the process of transporting a load
of oil at his employer's request when the incident occurred. The em-
ployee hit the plaintiff with a two and one-half foot wrench in the
heat of the ensuing argument.6 '
In determining liability under respondeat superior, the court
found the proper inquiry to be not whether the specific act was au-
thorized, but rather, whether the act was part of a series of acts
which were authorized by the employer as a whole.65
The Fields court emphasized a number of factors which led to
its decision. First, the employee had a duty by law to stop after the
collision occurred. Second, the argument and subsequent injury to
the plaintiff arose out of the employee's work performance. Lastly,
the employee immediately returned to his truck and proceeded with
his assignment following the assault.66 Thus, the assault was one in
a series of authorized acts and met the requirements of the court as
falling within the scope of employment.
The defendant in Fields claimed that the employee's work as a
truck driver was such that it was not foreseeable that the employee
62. Carr, 28 Cal. 2d at 656, 171 P.2d at 8. The employee did not act on his employer's
behalf by throwing the hammer. Neither can it be said that throwing the hammer was inciden-
tal to the employee's duties as a construction worker. Id.
63. Id. at 656-57, 171 P.2d at 8. See supra note 60. The Carr court found that not only
did the argument arise directly from the performance of the employee's duties, but, in fact, the
entire association between the employee and the plaintiff arose out of the construction per-
formed for the employer. Id. at 657, 171 P.2d at 8.
64. Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal. 2d 834, 836-38, 180 P.2d 684, 686-87 (1947).
65. Id. at 839, 180 P.2d at 688.
66. Id. at 839-40, 180 P.2d at 688-89. The employee's "entire course of action was
inextricably intertwined with his service to his employer." Id. at 840, 180 P.2d at 689.
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would come into contact with third parties or that the employee
would subsequently become emotionally upset and commit a tort."
The court dismissed this argument and concluded that the em-
ployee's tortious conduct was within the scope of employment as de-
fined in respondeat superior. 8
Carr and Fields are still considered leading cases in the field of
respondeat superior for their treatment of employees' intentional
torts. Both are commonly cited for the proposition that an employer's
responsibility under respondeat superior extends to liability for in-
tentional torts which are actually beyond his control. 9 In fact, as a
result of the great precedential value given to these decisions, at least
one court has held that Yates and Lane no longer have any signifi-
cant precedential value. 0
Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co.71 is a fairly recent example of a
decision following the reasoning set forth in Carr and Fields. The
facts in Rodgers involved a fight between the defendant general con-
tractor employees (Kemper) and the plaintiff employees of a subcon-
tractor on the same large construction job."a On the day the tort was
committed, the Kemper employees had finished their shift, but stayed
on the construction site to drink beer, socialize and work on one of
the two defendants' personal vehicles.73
In their efforts to borrow money for more drinking, the Kemper
employees asked one of the plaintiffs for a ride on the bulldozer he
was operating. When the plaintiff refused, the defendants beat
67. Id. at 841, 180 P.2d at 689.
68. Id. The Fields court cited its decision in Carr, emphasizing the foreseeability of the
risk of altercation and injury when an enterprise requires people to interact. The Fields court
further affirmed its recognition in Carr of the employer's responsibility for any tortious con-
duct that arose out of the interaction required by the employmeni. Id. See supra note 60.
69. See Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 956, 471 P.2d 988, 88 Cal. Rptr.
188 (1970); Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1975).
70. Rodgers, 50 Cal. App. 3d at 623-34, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 151-52. See infra notes 71-
83 and accompanying text.
71. 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1975).
72. Note the similarity between the facts here and in Carr. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 57-63.
73. Rodgers, 50 Cal. App. 3d at 615, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 146. On the evening in question,
much of the employees' time after their shift was spent in the "dry house" which Kemper
made available to its employees. The dry house was a trailer which had a shower room and
employee lockers where employees would normally shower and change after a shift. Addition-
ally, beer was often kept in the dry house with Kemper's knowledge, although it was not
supplied by the employer. The employees would often socialize and drink in the dry house
after a shift. This arrangement served Kemper as well as the employees because in the event
additional workers were needed for a particular shift, these workers could usually still be
found in the dry house after their shift was finished. Id. at 615, 619-20, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 146-
49.
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him."" Then the beaten plaintiff enlisted the help of the other plain-
tiff in discovering the identities of the Kemper employees. Another
fight broke out resulting in severe injuries to both plaintiffs. 76 First,
the court dismissed Kemper's contention that liability under respon-
deat superior was precluded because the assault took place after the
Kemper employees' work hours. Due to the factors surrounding the
dry house 7  and, in particular, the fact that Kemper benefited from
the workers' presence at the job site after the end of their shifts, the
court found this argument lacked merit.
7 7
The Rodgers court then dismissed the defendants' next conten-
tion that the assault arose out of personal malice unrelated to the
employment. Citing Carr, the court acknowledged that an assault
motivated by personal malice alone would not result in vicarious lia-
bility for the employer.78 However, the plaintiffs in Rodgers were
complete strangers to the defendants and there was evidence that the
dispute arose out of the employment relationship which was the
proximate cause of the assault. 79 The court determined this was suf-
ficient evidence that the assault was not merely motivated by per-
sonal malice.
Finally, the court found Kemper's reliance on Yates80 and
Lane8" groundless. Admitting Yates had never been technically over-
ruled, the Rodgers court nonetheless found the decision inconsistent
with subsequent case law. As a result, Yates' precedential value had
been eroded. 82 The court went on to state that the decision in Lane
was principally based upon a case which Carr expressly overruled. 8
74. Id. at 615, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
75. Id. at 615-16, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47.
76. See supra note 73 for a full description of the dry house.
77. Rodgers, 50 Cal. App. 3d at 619-20, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50. As indicated above,
the benefit to Kemper was that workers were routinely available after their shifts were over if
there was a need for overtime workers. Id. at 619-20, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
78. Id. at 621, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 150. The test, as stated by the court, is "[i]f the assault
was motivated by personal malice not engendered by the employment, the employer is not
vicariously liable; but otherwise, liability may be found if the injury results from 'a dispute
arising out of the employment.' " Id. (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 621-22, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51.
80. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
82. Rodgers, 50 Cal. App. 3d at 623, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 151-52.
83. Id. at 623-24, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53. The Rodgers court stated that Carr over-
ruled Stephenson v. Southern Pac. Co., 93 Cal. 558, 29 P. 234 (1892), because the Stephenson
holding had been contradicted by the findings of subsequent courts. Id. at 623-24, 124 Cal.
Rptr. at 152-53. In Stephenson, the act of a railroad engineer was held to be outside the scope
of employment when the engineer moved a railroad car with the intent of frightening passen-
gers in a nearby street-car. Id. at 562, 29 P. at 235. The court held that the intent to frighten
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Accordingly, Kemper was found liable for the torts committed by its
employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
E. Current Judicial Interpretation of "Scope"
Numerous California cases have followed the line set out above
in finding the employer liable for employees' intentional torts. 84
While the California courts have generally followed a fairly liberal
interpretation of the scope of employment as applied to respondeat
superior, currently there is inconsistency in the manner in which
courts are handling the issue. The following cases demonstrate this
disparate treatment.
First, however, the modern policy justifications for the respon-
deat superior doctrine, expressed by the California Supreme Court
in 1970 should be noted. The Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.85
case was essentially concerned with the "going and coming" rule.8
The facts of the case are, therefore, not pertinent to this Comment.87
However, the Hinman court's statements as to the policy justifi-
cations for respondeat superior are relevant to this discussion. The
court stated first, that the modern justification is a "rule of policy, a
deliberate allocation of [those] risks . .. which as a practical matter
are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer's enterprise."88 The
employer's assumption of the burden of these risks is simply seen as
a cost added to those generally required of the employer in doing
business.89 Some of the decisions that follow cite the Hinman policy
justifications in the court's opinions, and all of the courts appear to
was an unlawful purpose independent of the employer's purpose. Id.
84. See Clark Equipment Co. v. Wheat, 92 Cal. App. 3d 503, 154 Cal. Rptr. 874
(1979) (fraudulent misrepresentations made by employees in their various capacities for the
sale of a forklift found to be both reasonably foreseeable and within the scope of employment;
employer liable under respondeat superior); McKay v. County of San Diego, 111 Cal. App. 3d
251, 168 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1980) (the county, employer of an investigator for the district attor-
ney's office, was found liable when the investigator fraudulently procured and obtained an
arrest warrant and personally arrested plaintiff, committing the intentional tort of false arrest).
85. 2 Cal. 3d 956, 471 P.2d 988, 88 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1970).
86. "Under the ... rule, an employee who is going to or coming from work is generally
not . . . considered to be acting in the course or scope of his employment for purposes of...
respondeat superior." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 622 (5th ed. 1979). See also 2 B. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 129-134 (9th ed. 1987) for a general survey of California
law on the going and coming rule.
87. In Hiznan, an employee was involved in an automobile accident on the way home
from work in a company owned vehicle. At issue was whether the accident had occurred in the
scope of the employee's employment. Hinman, 2 Cal. 3d at 956, 471 P.2d at 988, 88 Cal.
Rptr. at 188.
88. Id. at 959, 471 P.2d at 990, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
89. Id. at 960, 471 P.2d at 990, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
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support the general idea presented in Hinman that the underlying
policy of the respondeat superior doctrine is one of allocation.
1. Use of the Carr Test
Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School District"0 is the first in a
line of decisions which has interpreted the scope of employment
under the doctrine of respondeat superior inconsistently. The facts in
Alma W. are as follows: an 11 year-old alleged that a custodian at
her school sexually molested and raped her in the custodian's office.
The girl's mother brought suit against the school principal and the
school district under the doctrine of respondeat superior.91 The Alma
W. court used the two-prong test originally set forth in Carr9" to
determine whether the custodian's act was within the scope of
employment. 98
Although the court noted that occupational duties are generally
defined broadly, it ultimately concluded that a substantial deviation
from work related matters would not result in employer liability
under the respondeat superior doctrine.94 In the instant case, the
court found the relationship between the employee's act and assigned
duties too attenuated to hold the employer liable.95
Additionally, the court determined that the fact that the assault
took place on the defendant school district's property and during
working hours was not determinative. Concluding with regard to the
first prong, the court found the custodian's act was not done on be-
90. 123 Cal. App. 3d 133, 176 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1981).
91. It should be noted that Alma W. and the other California cases that follow which
involve torts committed by government employees are controlled by California Governmeni
Code § 815.2. Section 815.2(a) provides:
A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of
an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or
omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action
against that employee or his personal representative.
CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 815.2 (West 1980). A court must look then to the common law for an
interpretation of what constitutes the "scope of employment" after determining that liability
may be imputed based on section 815.2. Alma W., 123 Cal. App. 3d at 138-39, 176 Cal. Rptr.
at 289.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
93. The test applied by the court was "whether or not: 1) the act performed was either
required or 'incident to his duties' [citation], or 2) the employee's misconduct could be reasona-
bly foreseen by the employer in any event [citations]." Alna W., 123 Cal. App. 3d at 139, 176
Cal. Rptr. at 289 (quoting Clark Equipment Co. v. Wheat, 92 Cal. App. 3d 503, 520, 154
Cal. Rptr. 874, 882 (1979)).
94. Alna W., 123 Cal. App. 3d at 139, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
95. Id. at 139-40, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90. The court stated that sexual molestation
was in no way related to custodial duties such as mopping floors and cleaning rooms. Id.
1990] RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR 61.3
half of his employer nor incidental to his duties, but rather was an
independent act unrelated to his work duties.96
The court next addressed the foreseeability prong of the Carr
test.'7 The plaintiff argued that the enactment of particular sections
of the California Education Code in order to prevent or safeguard
students from sexual offenses was an acknowledgement that sexual
assaults of students by school employees were foreseeable. 8 How-
ever, the Alma W. court found this stretched the foreseeability argu-
ment "beyond its logical limits," noting that ultimately the tort must
be determined as "characteristic of the enterprises' activities ... [and
it] defies every notion of fairness to say that rape is characteristic of a
school district's activities." '99
Lastly, the court rejected the plaintiff's contention that liability
for the school district was the most effective manner in which to
spread the risk because the employer was generally best able to bear
the loss. Assuming arguendo that the school district was best suited
for carrying this burden, the court nonetheless found that a sexual
assault did not fall within the category of losses which should be
reasonably borne by the employer.'
Four years later, a different California appellate court found
that the tortious conduct of a police officer was within the scope of
96. Id. at 141, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 291. The decision in Fields was quoted in support of
the conclusion that the fundamental issue is whether the act was committed in the course of a
series of authorized acts. However, "where an agent ...has ceased to serve his principal, he
alone is responsible for his acts during the period of cessation [citation omitted]." Id. (quoting
Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal. 2d 834, 839, 180 P.2d 684, 687 (1947)).
97. Alma W., 123 Cal. App. 3d at 141, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 291. The court applied the
Carr test as it was articulated in Rodgers. Foreseeability in this context is distinguished from
foreseeability in a negligence case where it is used to determine if a reasonably prudent indi-
vidual would take precautions in guarding against the occurrence of a particular event. Id.
Foresecability with regard to respondeat superior is used to determine if an employee's act is
so startling as to make it seem unfair to hold an employer responsible for the loss. It follows
then that liability for the employer will more often result under the respondeat superior doc-
trine than it does in a pure negligence context. Id. at 141-42, 176 Cal. Rptr. 291, (citing
Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 618-19, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148-49
(1975)).
98. Alma W., 123 Cal. App. 3d at 142, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 291. These education codes
attempted to set up a "screening mechanism to safeguard the school system against those with
a history of sexual offenses." The plaintiff claimed the existence of these codes alone indicated
the Legislature foresaw sexual assaults of school children by teachers. However, the court
refused to find that this altered the characterization of sexual assaults as aberrational acts. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 143-44, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93. The court determined that the justifica-
tions for respondeat superior did not dictate imputing liability as simply an easy way to reach
the deepest pocket or spread the loss. Regardless of the ability to compensate, the employer can
only be charged with the burden of risks directly attributable to the enterprise. Id.
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employment in White v. County of Orange. 10' The plaintiff, White,
was stopped by a deputy sheriff, an employee of the defendant
county, who was on patrol in a marked police vehicle. The deputy
sheriff placed White in his patrol car without any explanation, took
her to a secluded area where he threatened to rape and murder
her." 2 After driving her around for several hours and continuing to
threaten her, he eventually took White back to her car after she
promised to go out with him.
Recognizing that its interpretation of "incident to his duties" ' 3
would be determinative, the White court focused on the authority
which the county had entrusted in the deputy sheriff.' 4 The court
found that because "the police officer carrie[d] the authority of the
law with him into the community," the case was distinguishable
from the employment of the custodian in Alma W.'05
The way in which the police officer dealt with the authority
given to him by his employer was determined not only incidental to
his duties as a police officer, but integral to them.' 6 Therefore, the
wrongful acts were found to have directly flowed from the exercise of
his authority.' Consequently, if White were able to prove the fac-
tual allegations of her claim at trial, the county would be held liable
under the respondeat superior doctrine because, as the employer, it
had placed the officer in the position of authority enabling him to
commit the act.
The next decision which contributed to this judicial ambiguity
is Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop.' °8 The plaintiff was a
sixteen year old female parishioner who had been convinced by a
number of parish priests to have sexual intercourse with them. Rita
was told these acts were both ethically and religiously permissible by
these priests whom she greatly admired and respected. The conspir-
acy among the priests continued for over two years until Rita be-
101. 166 Cal. App. 3d 566, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1985).
102. Id. at 568, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
103. Id. at 571, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 496. The court expressly stated that it was following
Alma W. and applied the Carr test as that court did. "Incident to his duties" is the first prong
of the test for scope of employment. See supra notes 62-63.
104. White, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 571, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 496. The court noted that a
police officer "is supplied with a conspicuous automobile, a badge, and a gun to ensure imme-
diate compliance with his directions." Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The court reasoned that White stopped only because she had been ordered to
by a deputy sheriff, in uniform, in a marked patrol car, who used his flashing lights. In sum,
she yielded to the sheriff's apparent authority. Id.
108. 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1986).
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came pregnant. Swearing her to secrecy, the priests sent Rita to the
Philippines to have the baby.""9
The court used the Carr two-prong test 10 to determine
whether the priests' acts were within the scope of employment.111
The court quickly dismissed the "incidental to duties" prong and
then proceeded to find that the foreseeability test was not satisfied
either. The court followed the Alma W. decision, finding no differ-
ence between it and the instant case. 1 2 Accordingly, no liability was
imputed to the Archbishop under the respondeat superior doctrine.
Similarly, in Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist Church,"8 the re-
peated sexual molestation of a boy by his sunday school teacher was
held outside the scope of employment for respondeat superior pur-
poses. Using the familiar two-prong test, the court found the
teacher's acts were not required, not incidental to his duties, and not
foreseeable.1 4
Although the plaintiff used White to analogize the authority
given to a police officer with that given to a sunday school teacher,
the court found reliance on White was misplaced. The Jeffrey E.
court determined the wrongful acts did not flow from the exercise of
actual, "official" authority as they did in White."' Much of the au-
thority the teacher had over Jeffrey came from their relationship
through contacts other than sunday school and the church. The court
went on to note that these other contacts had actually been sanc-
tioned by Jeffrey's mother.11
The court found the abuse of authority in Jeffrey E. was more
akin to that in Rita M. The court found no basis on which it could
distinguish the situation of a Catholic priest from a Protestant sun-
day school teacher." 7 In conclusion, the relationship between the
wrongful act and the duties was too attenuated to impute liability.
109. Id. at 1456-57, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 687-88.
110. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
111. Rita M., 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1461, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
112. Id. The court cited Alma W. for the proposition that in order for an event to be
foreseeable, it must be characteristic of the activities of the enterprise. Id.
113. 197 Cal. App. 3d 718, 243 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1988).
114. Id. at 722, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 130. The court's justification was that there was no
evidence the assaults took place during sunday school and no evidence the conduct was done
with the purpose of serving the church. The acts were independent and self-serving. In addi-
tion, the court found the acts both startling and highly unusual and, thus, not foreseeable at
all. Id.
115. Id. at 723, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 131. The court also found it significant that a sexual
assault did not actually take place in White as it did in Jeffrey E. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 724, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 132;
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Another example of judicial refusal to impose vicarious liability
can be found in Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles.'18 The plaintiff,
Mary, was stopped by a police officer employed by the defendant
city for suspicion of drunk driving. The police officer proceeded to
give Mary a series of sobriety tests and threatened to take her to jail
when Mary did poorly on them." 9 Mary became very upset at this
prospect and the officer, without explanation, ordered her to get into
his patrol car. He then took the plaintiff to her home and raped
her. 120
As the courts before it, the Mary M. court found that according
to settled precedent an employee's wrongful act must fall within ei-
ther prong of the two-prong test in order to impute liability.' 2 1 Al-
though the White decision was heavily relied upon by the plaintiff,
the court refused to follow it as binding precedent.'
The court noted that occupational duties should be defined
broadly under the respondeat superior doctrine. However, it also
stated that every action taken by an employee would not result in
employer liability. Citing both Alma W. and Yates, the court held
that the rape committed by the police officer in Mary M. was an
"aberrational act" in no way related to his duties, completely not
work-related, and a substantial deviation from the employee's du-
ties. 12 Subsequently, the rape constituted an individual act for
which the employer was not liable."
118. 200 Cal. App. 3d 758, 246 Cal. Rptr. 487, ret,. granted sub non., Miller v. City
of Los Angeles, - Cal. 3d __, 756 P.2d 1348, 249 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1988) (reprinted for
tracking pending review 213 Cal. App. 3d 1464).
119. Id. at 762, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
120. Id. at 763, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 490. It bears noting that when the victim screamed,
cried, and otherwise resisted the rape, the police officer threatened to take her to jail if she did
not stop resisting. Id.
121. Id. at 766, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
122. Id. at 767, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 493. The court cites five reasons for not following
White: 1) White emanated from a court of equal justice and did not bind the Mar"y M. court; 2)
White failed to follow and apply well-established principles of case law; 3) the decision created
a new theory for vicarious liability which the Mary M. court interpreted as imposing strict
liability; 4) the court found the White decision unpersuasive; and 5) it was determined that
White was factually distinguishable. Id. Note, that the Jeffrey E. court also factually distin-
guished White, in part, on the basis that a sexual assault did not actually occur in White as it
did in Jeffrey E. See supra note 115. Jeffre y E., 197 Cal. App. 3d at 723, 243 Cal. Rptr. at
131.
123. Mary M., 200 Cal. App. 3d at 770-72, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 495-96.
124. Additionally, the MarY M. court held that as a matter of policy, the risk of injury
due to a sexual assault could not be allocated to the employer police department. The court
cited Hinman, see supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text, for establishing three predicates
to liability under respondeat superior: "(1) the existence of a profitmaking, business enterprise;
(2) a history of employee torts causing harm to others arising out of the profitmaking enter-
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The court addressed the second prong of the test, using both
Alma W. and Rita M. in support of its finding that the prong was
not satisfied. 12 5 The police officer's wrongful act was not only found
uncharacteristic of, but also "antithetical" to, his duties as a police
officer. 126
2. John R. and Kimberly M.
Two other California appellate court cases were decided within
three months of one another and both resulted in the employees' in-
tentionally tortious conduct being found within the scope of employ-
ment. However, the California Supreme Court modified one of these
cases, John R. v. Oakland Unified School District2 " and transferred
the other, Kimberly M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.,128 back
to the appellate* court for an opinion consistent with the John R.
holding. It should be emphasized that the supreme court did over-
turn the appellate courts directly on the respondeat superior issue.
However, due to the legal theories developed therein, the appellate
opinions are worthy of examination and will, accordingly, be dis-
cussed below.
a. Appellate Court Holdings
In John R. a fourteen year old boy was sexually assaulted by
his math teacher and his parents sued the school district under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. The plaintiffs in John R. relied
upon White, while the defendant cited Rita M. and Alma W. in sup-
port of its case. The court distinguished the latter two cases on the
basis of the lack of actual authority given to the tortfeasors in both
matters.'29 The teacher's authority and control over John in the in-
prise; and (3) the ability of the enterprise to absorb the losses through prices, rates, or liability
insurance." Id. at 772, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 496. Accordingly, in addition to the finding that the
assault did not satisfy either of the Carr/Alma W. prongs, the Mary M. court also found that
it did not meet the prerequisites to imposing vicarious liability. Id.
125. Id. at 772-74, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98. It is a police officer's duty to prevent
rapes, not to commit them or other felonies. Therefore, the officer's act was seen as highly
startling and unusual. Id.
126. Id. at 773, 246 Cal. Rptr. 497.
127. 194 Cal. App. 3d 1454, 240 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1987) (reprinted for tracking pending
review 206 Cal. App. 3d 1473), modified, 48 Cal. 3d 438, 769 P.2d 948, 256 Cal. Rptr. 766
(1989).
128. 196 Cal. App. 3d 1506, 242 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1987), rev,, granted, - Cal. 3d
- 750 P.2d 786, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1988) (reprinted for tracking pending review 209
Cal. App. 3d 1326), transf, later op., 215 Cal. App. 3d 545, 263 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1989).
129. John R., 194 Cal. App. 3d at 1467-68, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 327. The John R. court
concluded that neither the custodian in Alma W., nor the priests in Rita M., had any actual
19901
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stant case was found analogous to the sheriff's control over the plain-
tiff in White.'30 Therefore, the appellate court reversed the judgment
for nonsuit and found that the plaintiffs had stated a valid claim
under respondeat superior.
Similar to John R., Kimberly M. is another school-child moles-
tation case where the appellate court found the assault was within
the scope of employment. Five year old Kimberly was sexually mo-
lested after a teacher ordered her to undress. After giving a substan-
tial history on the treatment of respondeat superior liability for em-
ployees' intentional torts, the court focused on the control and
authority given school teachers over their students. 3
Again, Alma W. was distinguished by the court with an empha-
sis on the difference between teachers and custodians. The court
stated that school teachers are "certified employees, charged with the
duty of supervising, teaching and protecting children," and custodi-
ans are not.' 3"
Rita M. was also distinguished by the Kimberly M. court based
on the finding that the priests did not have actual, express authority
over Rita as this teacher did over Kimberly. 3 In conclusion, the
court found that a broad definition of the scope of employment was
required here. This broad definition, along with the emphasis on the
complete control given teachers in the classroom, warranted a finding
that the school district was liable under the respondeat superior
doctrine.
b. California Supreme Court Treatment of John R. and
Kimberly M.
There were two major issues before the supreme court in John
R.: the timeliness of the claim and the vicarious liability issue.'
authority over their victims. Therefore, they did not accomplish the assaults through the exer-
cise of job-created authority. Id.
130. Id. at 1469, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 328. The court focused not on whether a teacher's
sexual assault on a student was characteristic or foreseeable, but rather on whether "the as-
sault arose out of the exercise of job-created authority over the plaintiff student." Id.
131. Kimberly M., 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1517-19, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
132. Id. at 1518, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 620. The court noted that a statutory relationship
exists between a teacher and a student. For example, under California Penal Code section
11165, a teacher has a duty to report any suspected cases of child abuse and neglect. Id. See
Note, Reporting Child Abuse: When Moral Obligations Fail, 15 PAc. L.J. 189 (1983), for a
discussion of this statutory relationship.
133. Kimberly M., 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1519, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 620. As did theJohn R.
court, the Kimberly M. court found that priests had no actual authority over Rita and did not
commit their assaults through the exercise of their job-related duties. Id. See supra note 128.
134. 48 Cal. 3d 443, 769 P.2d 948, 256 Cal. Rptr. 768.
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Regarding the former, it need only be noted that the court held that
the claim did survive the timeliness question. 13 5
The court began its discussion of the respondeat superior issue
by initially noting that, under the traditional analysis, no liability
would be imposed under the circumstances in John R.' 6 The court
admitted that the facts of John R. could be "made to fit a version of
the respondeat superior doctrine." 3 7 However, the court instead
chose to focus on the underlying policy rationale for respondeat su-
perior and concluded that no liability would be imputed to the school
district." 8
Quoting its decision in Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons,
Inc., '9 the John R. supreme court considered the following reasons
for imposing liability on an enterprise for the risks incident to that
enterprise:
(1) [Ilt tends to provide a spur toward accident prevention; (2)
it tends to provide greater assurance of compensation for acci-
dent victims [;]and (3) at the same time it tends to provide rea-
sonable assurance that like other costs, accident losses will be
broadly and equitably distributed among the beneficiaries of the
enterprises that entail them."
The court quickly discarded the first two reasons as irrelevant
to the case at hand. The court found that the goal of encouraging
accident prevention played an insignificant role in the allocation of
liability for the sexual misconduct of employees.'" Neither did the
court find that the second reason, assurance of compensation for acci-
dent victims, would be properly invoked by imputing vicarious
liability. 42
However, the John R. court did find that the third reason, the
policy of spreading risk of loss among the beneficiaries of a particu-
135. Id. at 446, 769 P.2d at 952, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
136. Id. at 448, 769 P.2d at 953, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
137. Id. at 450, 769 P.2d at 955, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
138. Id.
139. 41 Cal. 3d at 967, 719 P.2d at 676, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
140. John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 451, 769 P.2d at 955, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 774 (quoting Perez,
41 Cal. 3d at 967, 719 P.2d 676, 227 Cal. Rptr. 108).
141. John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 451, .769 P.2d at 956, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 774. The court
determined that encouraging the careful selection of such employees and the close supervision
of their conduct would better be achieved by simply holding the districts to a level of due care
and only subjecting them to liability for acts involving negligence. Id.
142. Id. In particular, the court expressed its concern that insurance was a scarce re-
source for school districts. Imposing liability under these circumstances would make insurance
even harder to obtain, possibly leading to the diversion of necessary classroom funds to pay the
increased costs. Id.
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lar enterprise, might point towards the imposition of vicarious liabil-
ity.143 However, ultimately, the court found there was a lack of
nexus. The connection between the authority given to teachers and
the abuse of that authority to carry out personal sexual misconduct is
"too attenuated to deem a sexual assault as falling within the range
of risks allocable to a teacher's employer."' 44
The supreme court's reversal of the appellate court's ruling on
the respondeat superior issue is clear and unambiguous. However,
the court was also very clear in limiting its decision to the teacher-
student sexual molestation scenario. While the court subsequently
transferred Kimberly M. to the Second Appellate District with direc-
tions to vacate and reconsider in light of its decision in John R.,'"
the court also expressly declined to overrule White.' 46 It distin-
guished the authority of a police officer over a motorist from that of
a teacher over a student finding that the former clearly surpassed the
latter.'
47
There were two separate dissents on the respondeat superior
issue. The first, written, by Justice Mosk, was primarily an affirm-
ance of the appellate court's opinion. Justice Mosk distinguished
Alma W. and Rita M. on a factual basis and then proceeded to anal-
ogize the facts to those in White, finding them analytically symmetri-
cal. 48 Concluding, the Justice reiterated that the focus of the inquiry
should be on whether the assault arose out of the exercise of job-
created authority and found that clearly it did.' 49
Justice Kaufman wrote a separate dissent in which he initially
admitted that it is a rare case in which a school district should be
held vicariously liable for a teacher's sexual molestation of a student.
143. Id. at 451-52, 769 P.2d at 956, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 774. It was admitted that school
districts and the community at large benefit from conferring authority on teachers which aids
them in carrying out their duties. Id. Additionally, the court conceded that it could be "argued
that the consequences of an abuse of that authority should be shared on an equally broad
basis." Id.
144. Id.
145. 261 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1989).
146. John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 452, 769 P.2d at 956-57, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 774-75. In fact,
the court refused to comment at all on the general applicability of respondeat superior to torts
committed by police officers. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Citing the Third Amended Complaint as his source, Justice Mosk found that the
teacher in John R., "through the use of his authority to administer grades, to assign extracur-
ricular work projects, and, significantly, by utilizing the school-approved work experience pro-
gram, . . . procured the student's presence in his home facilitating the opportunity for the
assault." Id. at 454-55, 769 P.2d at 958, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
[Vol. 30
1990] RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
However, he found that John R. is such a rare case.' 50 Additionally,
Kaufman's dissent admitted that, at first glance, it seems unfair to
include this liability as a cost of the employer's business. However,
Justice Kaufman subsequently found that sexual assaults and moles-
tations in the workplace are not uncommon and, therefore, not so
"unusual or startling that it would be unfair" to impose liability
upon the employer.1 51 Justice Kaufman condemned the majority for
not addressing the above realities and urged for a narrow, fact spe-
cific decision holding the district liable for the teacher's assault. 5
Finally, Justice Kaufman addressed the policy rationale used by
the majority and concluded that " 'public policy' militates strongly in
favor of vicarious liability in this case."' 53 In conclusion, Kaufman
found that the nexus between the teacher's misconduct and the risks
inherent in the district sanctioned program is clear and direct. Ac-
cordingly, it is only fair, just, and consistent with the theory of re-
spondeat superior that the district bear the cost of resulting losses.",
The Second Appellate District opinion in Kimberly M., subse-
quent to the supreme court transfer of the case, was quite brief and
merely reiterated the higher court decision in John R. 155 Specifically,
the court noted that the policy reasons for respondeat superior did
not support a finding of liability for the school district in a teacher
150. Id. at 463, 769 P.2d at 964, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
151. Id. Justice Kaufman found the reluctance to recognize sexual assaults expected and
understandable. However, the sad reality is that they are not uncommon occurrences. Id. It
should be noted that the John R. majority found Justice Kaufman's conclusion "an unduly
pessimistic view of human nature." Id. at 450 n.9, 769 P.2d at 955 n.9, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 773
n.9.
152. Justice Kaufman emphasized that:
The district did not require that a student obtain the written permission of his
parents to participate in the IWE program at the teacher's home, nor did it
require that other students or adults be present during the home instruction. In
effect, the district-sanctioned IWE program virtually guaranteed that the
teacher could act with impunity, free from the fear of interruption or discovery,
fully assured of complete privacy and secrecy.
Id. at 465, 769 P.2d at 965, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
153. Id. at 466, 769 P.2d at 966, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 784. Justice Kaufman contended
that imposing vicarious liability would act as a spur to accident prevention by inducing, not
preventing, the creation of well-planned and properly-executed extracurricular programs. Id.
Additionally, Kaufman found that "the assurance of fair compensation for tort victims by
spreading the risk of losses through insurance carried by the responsible enterprise as a cost of
doing business ...[citation omitted] amply justify the imposition of vicarious liability." Id.
Kaufman also noted that insurance coverage would be available pursuant to Insurance Code
section 533 regardless of the intentional nature of the torts. Id. at 466 n.2, 769 P.2d at 966
n.2, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 784 n.2.
154. Id. at 466, 769 P.2d at 966, 256 Cal. Rptr at 784.
155. Kimberly M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 215 Cal. App. 3d 545, 263 Cal.
Rptr. 612 (1989).
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molestation of a student. 156 In addition, it was noted that the nexus
between the authority granted a school teacher to carry out his duties
and personal sexual misconduct is too attenuated to impose vicarious
liability.1
57
A separate opinion by Associate Justice Johnson concurred with
the majority's result due to the binding effect of John R. upon the
appellate court. However, Johnson took issue with the supreme
court's John R. opinion, urging that court to reconsider the breadth
of the holding as applied to the facts in Kimberly M.' 5 8
Due to the age difference between John R. and Kimberly M.
and what he found to be an unnecessarily broad rule in John R., the
Associate Justice urged the supreme court to reconsider and narrow
the John R. decision using Kimberly M. as a means of doing so.159
However, as of yet, the court has failed to do so.
F. Interpretation of the Scope of Employment in Other
Jurisdictions
As with many areas of law, the California judiciary is more
liberal than most other jurisdictions in allowing liability under the
respondeat superior doctrine. Generally, courts can be divided into
two broad categories: those which apply a broad standard of inter-
pretation and those which apply a more narrow one. 60 A court may
apply its own particularized standard, but will generally apply the
respondeat superior doctrine within its self-prescribed margins. 61
As indicated above, the majority of jurisdictions are quite strict
in determining that the commission of an intentional tort is within
the scope of employment. For example, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that a security guard's rape and assault of a woman
was outside the scope of employment in Rabon v. Guardsmark'6 2
The Rabon court justified its decision on the basis that the act was
not in furtherance of the employer's business and, in fact, was the
converse of the guard company's purpose to protect.
The doctrine of respondeat superior was held inapplicable by
156. Id. at 549, 263 Cal. Rptr at 614.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 550, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
160. Note, Owner Liability for Intentional Torts Committed by Professional Athletes
Against Spectators, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 565, 571-72 (1981).
161. See generally, id. for an explanation of different standards used with each of the
general categories.
162. 571 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978).
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the Southern District Court of New York in Vargas v. Correa."6 8
The court determined that a prison guard's attack on an inmate over
which television program would be watched was not a job-related
dispute. Therefore, the attack was outside the scope of employment.
The state of Louisianas interpretation of the scope of employ-
ment, however, has been expansive. State courts in this jurisdiction
routinely find intentional torts committed by employees within the
scope of employment for respondeat superior purposes.
In Applewhite v. City of Baton Rouge,16 4 a police officer and a
corrections officer took a woman into custody, forced her to engage in
oral copulation and raped her. The police officer alone was crimi-
nally convicted and Applewhite sued both the perpetrators, as indi-
viduals, and the city of Baton Rouge, under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior."'
The court found the city vicariously liable and noted that the
"officer was on duty in uniform and armed and was operating a
police unit at the time" of the assault.16 Of particular significance
was the fact that the officer was able to separate Applewhite from
the friends she had been walking with because of the force and au-
thority his position as a police officer gave him.'6 '
In summary, the Applewhite court stated, "where it is found
that a law enforcement officer has abused the 'apparent authority'
given such persons to act in the public interest, their employers...
[will be] required to respond in damages."' 16
The Louisiana Court of Appeals found a sexual assault by a
National Guard recruiting officer within the scope of employment in
Turner v. State.' 9 The recruiting officer had come to the home of
three young women, at their request, to interview them for induction
into the National Guard. During the course of the interview, the
officer deceived them into believing he had the authority to perform
physical examinations on them which, subsequently, the women per-
mitted him to do.'17 The women filed suit against the state as the
163. 416 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
164. 380 So. 2d 119 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
165. Id. at 120.
166. Id. at 121.
167. Id. The court further explained that due to the considerable public trust and au-
thority given public servants, policy required that these public employers be responsible for the
actions of their employees. This would be true even if the action taken is somewhat removed
from the employee's usual duties. Id.
168. Id. at 122.
169. 494 So. 2d 1292 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
170. Id. at 1294.
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officer's employer after learning they were not admitted into the
Guard, and that the officer was not authorized to conduct the physi-
cal examinations.
The court found the recruiting officer's actions "were closely
connected in time, place, and causation to his employment duties." 71
The officer was allowed into the women's home solely because of his
position as a National Guard recruiting officer. He misled the
women into believing that conducting physical exams was part of his
duties as a recruiting officer. The court concluded his actions were so
closely related to the employment that the employer, who put the
officer in a position of trust and authority for the purpose of contact-
ing and recruiting young people into the National Guard, was held
liable.""
While other jurisdictions may also be expanding their interpre-
tations of the respondeat superior doctrine," 3 Louisiana's interpreta-
tion most closely parallels that which some of the California courts
have followed and the state as a whole may be moving towards.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The problem that has developed in this area is one of uniform-
ity. An analysis of the case law indicates that a ruling made by a
California court on the scope of employment cannot be predicted
with any certainty. Cases which are not significantly factually distin-
guishable have resulted in contradictory holdings. Each court has de-
cided to follow different, conflicting precedent.
The White" and Mary M.i"5 decisions are an example of this
uncertainty. Both employees were law enforcement officials who
stopped and detained the plaintiffs while on duty. This initial action
was unquestionably done in the performance of their prescribed du-
171. Id. at 1295. The court cited a Louisiana Supreme Court case for establishing four
factors to be considered when determining whether the respondeat superior doctrine should
apply. The factors are: "(1) whether the tortious act was primarily employment rooted; (2)
whether the act was reasonably incidental to the performance of the employee's duties; (3)
whether the act occurred on the employer's premises; and (4) whether it occurred during the
hours of employment." Id. (citing LeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So. 2d 216 (La. 1974)).
172. Id. at 1296. The court found the officer's tortious conduct "reasonably incidental to
the performance of his duties" despite the fact that the conduct was unauthorized and "obvi-
ously motivated by his personal interests." Id.
173. See Note, Willians v. Alaska Pipeline Services: Alaska Extends Its Modified En-
terprise Theory of Respondeat Superior to Intentional Torts, 19 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 819
(1983).
174. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
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ties. The officers in both cases then put the plaintiffs in their police
cars without officially arresting them. Thus, both of the plaintiffs
were falsely imprisoned.
The only factual distinction that can be made between the two
cases is that the plaintiff in White was not raped and remained in
the patrol car during the time she was held. However, in Mary M.,
the officer took the plaintiff to her home where he raped her.' 7 '
Each court has a substantial amount of discretion in making its
rulings and has no obligation to follow the decision of a court of
equal justice. However, there is undisputably a problem when two
cases with almost identical legal issues are decided differently within
the same state. A certain amount of predictability and consistency is
both desired and necessary in order for the judiciary to operate in an
efficient manner.
However, probably the strongest indicator that a problem exists
in this area is evidenced by the fact that the California Supreme
Court is reevaluating the issue in Mary M."'
IV. ANALYSIS
Although there is considerable disagreement over defining the
parameters of the scope of employment under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior, California courts have at least agreed on the test to be
applied when determining these parameters. With few exceptions,
the two-pronged test originally set forth in Carr has consistently
been used by the California courts discussed in this Comment.' 78 It
must be remembered that the Carr/Alma W. test is applied on an
"either-or" basis. Only one prong need be satisfied in order to im-
pute liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
176. The court in Mary M. found this distinction was very important and pointed out
that the Jeffrey E. court, which was the same court that decided White, noted that there were
no sexual acts committed in White, thus, explaining the inconsistent decisions. Mary M. v.
City of Los Angeles, 200 Cal. App. 3d 758, 768-69, 246 Cal. Rptr. 487, 494 n.3, rev. granted
sub nom., Miller v. City of Los Angeles, - Cal. 3d __ , 756 P.2d 1348, 249 Cal. Rptr.
289 (1988) (reprinted for tracking pending review 213 Cal. App. 3d 1464).
177. As of May 4, 1990, Mary M. is still in the briefing stage. Telephone interview
with Bridget Newman, Clerk, California Supreme Court (May 4, 1990).
178. Those exceptions are John R. and Kimberly M. The California Supreme Court
essentially used a policy argument in its decision in John R. and the Second Appellate District
followed this policy rationale in the Kimberly M. decision. See supra notes 134-59 and accom-
panying text. An analysis of these decisions will follow the general analysis of the two-prong
test. See infra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
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A. The First Prong
1. Strict Interpretation of First Prong
A strict interpretation of the "incident to his duties" prong al-
lows employers to escape liability for the intentional torts committed
by an employee. In Alma W., the court found the relationship be-
tween the act and the custodial duties too attenuated for the prong to
be satisfied.1 " The Alma W. court reasoned that the rape was not an
integral part of a course of action undertaken by the janitor on be-
half of his employer, the school district. 80 The act committed was
distinguished as an "independent, self-serving pursuit" completely
unrelated to the janitor's employment duties.18'
In the case of a police officer assaulting a detainee, a strict read-
ing of the "incident to duties" prong provided the court with the
guidance which lead to a determination that no respondeat superior
liability would be found in Mary M." 2 The court emphasized that
the duties of a police officer were "to Protect and to Serve"; rape
does not fit within this succinct description of an officer's duties. 8 '
In Rita M., any possible "incident to his duties" claim is dis-
missed in a single sentence. The court stated that the plaintiff "could
not seriously contend that sexual relations with parishioners are ei-
ther required by or instant to a priest's duties."' 84
It seems clear then that a strict interpretation of this first prong
will render the respondeat superior doctrine inapplicable in most
cases. It can always be argued that any time an intentionally tortious
act is committed, particulary one of violence, the employee is not
acting strictly within his prescribed duties. Violent, tortious acts are
rarely, if ever, sanctioned and authorized by employers. A strict ap-
plication of the prong will, therefore, result in a great restriction in
liability for intentional torts under the respondeat superior doctrine.
For example, applying the hypothetical set forth in the Intro-
duction, your client would certainly not have a valid respondeat su-
perior cause of action against the day care center. The sexual moles-
179. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
180. Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 123 Cal. App. 3d 133, 141, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 287, 291 (1981).
181. Id.
182. Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 200 Cal. App. 3d 758, 246 Cal. Rptr. 487, rev.
granted sub noa. Miller v. City of Los Angeles, - Cal. 3d -, 756 P.2d 1348, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 289 (1988) (reprinted for tracking pending review 213 Cal. App. 3d 1464).
183. Id. at 771, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
184. Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453, 1461, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 685, 690 (1986).
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tation of a pre-schooler is certainly not in any day care teacher's job-
description. Therefore, although the center has impliedly, if not ex-
pressly, held out the teacher as a competent and reliable provider of
child care, there will be no respondeat liability imputed for the sex-
ual molestation by those courts using a strict interpretation.
2. Broad Interpretation of First Prong
Other California courts are more expansive in their interpreta-
tion of what constitutes actions "incident to [an employee's] duties."
These courts focus on whether the tortious act arose out of the exer-
cise of authority granted by the employer.
Thus, the court in White held the employer liable for the tor-
tious acts of its employee, a deputy sheriff.'85 The court found that
White justifiably relied upon the apparent authority of the sheriff.
Because the county enjoys tremendous benefits from the public's reli-
ance on and respect for this authority, the court concluded that the
county "must suffer the consequences when the authority is
abused."' 86
Following the White court's rationale, the appellate courts in
both John R. 8 ' and Kimberly M. '88 also found that job-created au-
thority was pivotal in imposing liability under respondeat superior
for teachers' sexual molestations of students. In John R., the teacher
told John that "the sexual conduct was part of his role as a teacher
designed to help . . . [him] with his problems."189 The Kimberly M.
court emphasized that a five year old child has no control over what
transpires in the classroom and must, generally, acquiesce to the au-
thority of the teacher.' 90
These courts interpret the coverage of the first prong as
185. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
186. White v. County of Orange, 166 Cal. App. 3d 566, 571-72, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493,
496 (1985).
187. John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1454, 240 Cal. Rptr.
319, mnodified, 48 Cal. 3d 438, 769 P.2d 948, 256 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1989). The court found the
case at bench was analytically symmetrical with White due to the fact that the teacher was able
to commit the assault only through exercising his official authority. Id. at 1468-69, 240 Cal.
Rptr. at 328.
188. Kimberly M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 196 Cal. App. 3d 1506, 242
Cal. Rptr. 612 (1987), re,. granted, - Cal. 3d - , 750 P.2d 786, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905
(1988) (reprinted for tracking pending review 209 Cal. App. 3d 1326), transf., later op. 215
Cal. App. 3d 545, 263 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1989). Although, the Kimberly M. court acknowledged
that the "trappings of authority" were not as great with a teacher as they were with a police
officer. Id. at 1517, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
189. John R., 194 Cal. App. 3d at 1468, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
190. Kimberly M., 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1517-18, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
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broader. The focus here is on the job-created authority and control
which are given to the employee and the subsequent manner in
which they are exercised. As is evidenced above, it is assumed, and
often required, that the public will submit to and rely upon officially
exercised authority. Therefore these courts consider it unjust for the
public to both be required to submit to the authority and pay the
consequences of possible abuses of that same authority. Many more
employers will be found liable under the respondeat superior doc-
trine in courts following this rationale, including the day care center
in the original hypothetical.
B. The Second Prong
In order to base liability on the second prong of the scope of
employment test, it must be determined that the employee's conduct
is foreseeable, regardless of whether it is considered incidental to the
employee's duties. Those courts strictly interpreting the first prong
also apply the second prong in this same strict manner. However,
those courts that broadly interpret the "incidental to duties" test, do
not appear to even reach the second prong in their analysis.
1. Strict Interpretation of Second Prong
In Alma W., Rita M., and Mary M., the courts all found that
the acts in question did not meet the foreseeability prong of the test.
The Alma W. court determined that the proper test was "whether
the employee's act is foreseeable in light of the duties the employee is
hired to perform."'191 Accordingly, while the court considered it fore-
seeable that a janitor might become involved in a dispute over his
custodial duties, a sexual assault would be highly unusual and very
startling. 92 Thus, the sexual assault was not forseeable.
Both the Rita M. and Mary M. courts applied the second prong
in this same manner and subsequently concluded that the foresee-
ability prong was not met. The Rita M. court stated that it "[d]efies
all logic and fairness" to find sexual activity between a priest and a
parishioner characteristic of the Roman Catholic Archbishop."' The
court in Mary M. reasoned that a rape was not only uncharacteristic
191. Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 123 Cal. App. 3d 133, 142, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 287, 291 (1981).
192. Id. at 142-43, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 291-92.
193. Rita M. v. Catholic Archbishop, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453, 1462, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685,
690 (1986).
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of the duties of a police officer, but antithetical to them. 194 The act
was, therefore, determined to be clearly outside the scope of
employment.
2. Absence of Judicial Treatment of Second Prong by Those
Courts Broadly Interpreting First Prong
Those courts which use a broad interpretation of the first prong
of the test appear to almost disregard the second prong. Because the
Carr/Alma W. test is an "either-or" proposition, both prongs need
not be satisfied to impute liability. It logically follows then that those
courts imposing respondeat superior liability on the basis of the first
prong will not find it necessary to use the second prong.
In White, the court based the employer's liability on the first
prong and, consequently, did not consider whether or not the act was
foreseeable. 95 The appellate court in John R. expressly chose to fo-
cus on the job-created authority aspect in regard to the first prong
rather than foreseeability.' 9 Similarly, the first appellate decision in
Kimberly M. focused on this authority aspect in reaching its
decision. 97
C. Modern Justifications for Respondeat Superior
1. Hinman Justifications as Policy Rationale
An analysis would not be complete without including a discus-
sion of modern courts' justifications for respondeat superior. The
court in Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.'98 is credited with ex-
pressing the justifications which had actually been followed for years
previous to the Hinman decision.' 99 These justifications can best be
explained as a rule of policy involving the deliberate allocation of
risk.
194. Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 773, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
See supra text accompanying note 182.
195. White v. County of Orange, 166 Cal. App. 3d 566, 571, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493, 496
(1985). The court expressly applied the Carr/Ahna W. two-prong test which would result in
liability for the county if the allegations made were actually proven. However, as the court
noted, the decision turned on the interpretation of the first prong. Id.
196. John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1473, 1482, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 319, 328. The court stated: "[wle focus not on whether the school teacher's sexual activ-
ity with a student is either 'characteristic' or foreseeable, but rather on whether the assault
arose out of the exercise of job-created authority over the plaintiff student." Id.
197. Kimberly M., 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1518-20, 242 Cal. Rptr at 620-21. See supra
text accompanying note 190.
198. 2 Cal. 3d 956, 471 P.2d 988, 88 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1970).
199. 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §115 (9th ed. 1987).
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The Hinman policy reasons for deliberate allocation of risk in-
clude: because the employer is engaged in a business which will, on
the basis of past experience, cause others harm through an em-
ployee's torts; the employer rather than the innocent injured plaintiff
should bear the risks; and, the employer is better able to absorb them
or pass them off to another (e.g. to the consumer through price in-
creases)."' 0 Furthermore, the court noted that the employer may
spread the risk through insurance and include the cost as part of the
general cost of doing business.2 '
In the decisions above, courts occasionally used the Hinman
rule as support for their holdings. The court in Alma W. quoted the
Hinman rule as set forth above and determined that, a sexual assault
was not a risk that should be allocable to an employer.202 The ex-
press terms of the Hinman rule were interpreted to only result in
the application of the respondeat superior doctrine for those losses
which are sure to occur in the carrying on of the employer's busi-
ness. The implication made by the court was that a sexual assatilt is
not sure to occur in the enterprise of a public school district.
The Mary M. court refused to even apply the Hinman rule.
The court stated that "since a police department does not satisfy the
Hinman prerequisites for vicarious liability, [no liability is found] in
the case at bench."' 0 3 In addition, the act of rape by a police officer
is not "sure to occur," but rather the court found it is "highly un-
likely to occur. '"204
Although the original Kimberly M. appellate court decision did
not specifically refer to the Hinman rule, the court sought to, and
believed it succeeded in, deliberately allocating the risk as a matter of
policy.205 The court expressly concerned itself with the protection of
both innocent teachers and innocent students and parents.206 Con-
200. Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 956, 959-60, 471 P.2d 988, 990, 88
Cal. Rptr. 190.
201. Id. (quoting Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal. 2d 54, 64, 181 P.2d 645, 651, (1947)).
202. Ala W., 123 Cal. App. 3d at 144, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93. See supra text
accompanying note 191.
203. Mar y M., 200 Cal. App. 3d at 772, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 496. See supra text accom-
panying note 194. See also supra note 123 for a list of the Hinman prerequisites.
204. Id. Such a criminal act was found to be highly unlikely to occur in light of the
extensive screening procedures used by the Los Angeles Police Department in its hiring pro-
cess. Id.
205. Kimberly M., 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1340, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 621. See supra text
accompanying note 197.
206. Id. The concern for teachers involved those who may have to provide their own
defense if a school district would not provide one for them since the district itself was free from
liability. The court was also concerned with those innocent parents and students who would
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cluding, the appellate court noted that both school districts and the
community in general enjoy a great number of benefits from the
"students respect for the authority placed in teachers. Therefore, it
must suffer the consequences when the authority is abused." ' 7
It seems clear then that the components of the Hinman rule can
be interpreted either to prohibit or permit liability under the respon-
deat superior doctrine. As the Mary M. decision demonstrates, a
strict interpretation of the rule and doctrine will result in no liability
to the employer unless the tort committed was of the type certain to
occur in the type of business engaged in.
A more expansive interpretation will result in liability for the
employer in ,those situations where the general policy concerns ex-
hibited in the Hinman rule will best be served. As indicated above,
the basic consideration of the rule is the allocation of risks to the
party who is best able to bear them. This allocation can best be
achieved through a liberal application of the rule rather than a strict,
technical one.
Returning to the case of the hypothetical day care center, be-
cause a sexual molestation is not "sure to occur," there will be no
respondeat superior liability imputed strictly following the predicates
of the Hinman rule. However, more broadly interpreting both the
predicates and the policy involved will allow the hypothetical client
to bring a cause of action based upon the respondeat superior doc-
trine. This would best serve the "spirit" of the Hinman rule in
terms of appropriately allocating the risk to those who benefit from
the enterprise in question.
2. Perez Reasons as Policy Rationale
The California Supreme Court's rationale in John R. and the
Kimberly M. decision which followed it require an analysis separate
from that under the Carr/Alma W. test. The primary reason for the
separate analysis is that the John R. court did not use the two-prong
test in its analysis. Rather, the John R. court expressly based its
decision on the underlying rationale for the respondeat superior
doctrine.2"'
As did those courts discussed in the above section, the John R.
have a much greater chance of recovery against the school district which can distribute the loss
more easily than an individual teacher. Id.
207. Id.
208. John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 450, 769 P.2d at 955, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 773. Explaining the
focus on the policy rationale, the court made it clear that the decision would not be drawn
from any applicable precedent. Id. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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court extensively quoted the Hinman decision for the proposition
that " 'the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of pol-
icy, a deliberate allocation of a risk.' "209 Additionally, the court ana-
lyzed the John R. facts in terms of their relationship to three enu-
merated reasons for imposing vicarious liability. Those three reasons
are:
(1) [I]t tends to provide a spur toward accident prevention; (2)
it tends to provide greater assurance of compensation for acci-
dent victims[;J and (3) at the same time it tends to provide rea-
sonable assurance that, like other costs, accident losses will be
broadly and equitably distributed among the beneficiaries of the
enterprises that entail them. 10
The court found that none of these reasons would be served by im-
posing vicarious liability on the school district for the teacher's
molestation.211
The John R. court's use of the Perez policy reasons should not
be interpreted as, altering in any significant way, previous case law
for two reasons. First, the Perez reasons are not substantively differ-
ent than the language contained in Hinman and that used for years
by California courts as the justification for respondeat superior. Both
the Hinman and Perez versions demonstrate a concern for providing
victims with adequate compensation"' and the desire to require ben-
eficiaries of an enterprise or employment bear any risk of or actual
loss."' 3
209. Id. (quoting Hinuan, 2 Cal. 3d at 959-60, 471 P.2d at 990, 88 Cal. Rptr at 190.
See supra note 200.).
210. Id. at 451, 769 P.2d at 955, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 773-74 (quoting Perez v. Van
Groningen & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal. 3d 962, 967, 719 P.2d 676, 678, 227 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108
(1986)).
211. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
212. In Himnan, the supreme court stated that it "is just that [the employer), rather
than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear" the losses caused by torts committed by em-
ployees. Hinman, 2 Cal. 3d at 960, 471 P.2d at 990, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 190. In Perez, the court
found that imposing liability on the employer for an employee's torts "tends to provide greater
assurance of compensation for accident victims." Perez, 41 Cal. 3d at 967, 719 P.2d at 678,
227 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
213. The Hinman court places losses on
the employer because [he has] engaged in an enterprise which will, on the basis
of past experience, involve harm to others and [seeks] to profit by it . . . and
because he is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices,
rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the
community at large.
Hinnian, 2 Cal. 3d at 960, 471 P.2d at 990, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 190. The Perez court found that
imposing liability "tend[ed] to provide reasonable assurance that, like other costs, accident
losses will be broadly and equitably distributed among the beneficiaries of the enterprises that
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While the Hinman version does not expressly justify imposing
liability as a spur toward prevention of loss or harm as in the Perez
reasons, it seems clear that this can be implicitly found in the Hin-
man justification. By placing the burden of any resulting loss on the
employer, it is only logical to assume that the prudent businessper-
son will attempt to prevent any injuries in order to reduce his own
risk of loss. Thus, it is evident that the use of the Perez reasons in
addition to the Hinman justification in the John R. analysis does not
constitute any substantial deviation from the traditional policy ra-
tionale for the respondeat superior doctrine.
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the John R. court
does not expressly overrule anything except the appellate court deci-
sion of that case. Therefore, although the court focused on policy in
its analysis, no indication was given that the Carr/Alma W. test is
not still the prevailing mode of analysis for respondeat superior
cases. Absent any express language mandating an overruling, of the
prevailing test, one should certainly not be inferred.
Accordingly, it can only be assumed that due to the majority's
interpretation of unique facts surrounding the imposition of liability
on a school district for a teacher's sexual molestation,1 4 the John R.
court refused to impose such liability. It follows that the John R. and
Kimbe ly M. decisions should only be considered an aberration from
the typical California judicial analysis of respondeat superior under
the Carr/Alma W. test.
While, it is certainly true that the above decisions must be fol-
lowed as valid California precedent, they should not be interpreted
as having changed the course of respondeat superior law. Addition-
ally, because the court did not follow the established analysis, these
decisions may be more vulnerable to overruling by subsequent
courts. When an issue is decided by a court based on a policy ration-
ale as opposed to the application of an established test, the issue may
be more vulnerable to overruling, particularly when the political
make-up of the court or the general social/political climate changes.
Regardless, as stated above, the John R. decision is binding in terms
of prohibiting the imposition of vicarious liability on a school district
for a teacher's sexual molestation of a student. However, the lan-
guage clearly limits the holding to these particular circumstances.
entail them." Perez, 41 Cal. 3d at 967, 719 P.2d at 678, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
214. See supra notes 134-47 and accompanying text.
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V. PROPOSAL
There is a clear need for a more definitive test for the scope of
employment. In order for an efficient analysis of the scope of em-
ployment to be achieved, the test must be free from as much ambigu-
ity as possible, thereby preventing interpretations which may yield
contradictory results.
The two-prong test originally set forth in Carr,21 which more
recent courts have adopted as the Alma W. test, can partially be sal-
vaged without jeopardizing clarity. In fact, the second foreseeability
prong need not be altered at all. This part of the test may remain
intact to impute liability to an employer when the tort is foreseeable
to the extent that it is characteristic of the enterprises' activities.21
However, the first prong of the test needs to be amended. As it
exists now, vicarious liability will result for the employer for any act
done on behalf of the employer or which can be determined inciden-
tal to the employee's duties. The first portion of this prong needs no
further clarification. Any act required by the terms of employment or
apparently done on the employer's behalf will result in liability for
the employer.
The "incident to his duties" portion, however, should be defined
more clearly and expansively. A more expansive interpretation is
justified. Employers profit, as well as society as a whole, from vest-
ing certain employees with a great deal of control and authority to
aid them in carrying out their duties.21
This benefit derived by both the employer and society is not
necessarily a monetary one. Rather, it is the benefit that comes from
entrusting particular employees with control and authority in order
for their duties to be carried out in a manner the employer and soci-
ety believe is most efficient. The control and authority in these situa-
tions are so extensive and unusual that it has permitted the employee
to commit the tort in a manner which he clearly could not otherwise
achieve.
Situations in which such control and authority are vested in em-
ployees only occur in a very narrow range of occupations. The most
obvious of these occupations are police officers and teachers, case ex-
amples of which can be found in the background above. The addi-
tion of one phrase to the first prong would be sufficient to effect the
215. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
216. Thus, this would even permit retention of the narrower interpretation of foresee-
ability as articulated in Abna W. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
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needed change. With the proposed change the Carr/Alma W. test
will now read:
An act committed by an employee will be considered as in the
scope of employment if either 1) the act performed was either
required or 'incident to his duties,' including an act done in
the course of exercising job-created control and authority
which are incidental to the employee's duties, or 2) the em-
ployee's misconduct could be reasonably foreseen by the em-
ployer in any event....
This language is narrow enough to ensure that the broadening of
employer liability will be limited to those situations where the job-
created control and authority2 1' actually facilitated the commission of
the tort.
For example, in Turner,22° the National Guard recruiting of-
ficer convinced the plaintiffs that he was authorized to conduct phys-
ical examinations only by virtue of his apparent authority in carry-
ing out his recruiting duties. The National Guard benefitted from
giving the officer the control and authority he abused. In fact, it is
necessary for the National Guard to vest some authority in a recruit-
ing officer in order to continue as an enterprise. The Guard is re-
ceiving a tangible benefit as a result of vesting this authority in the
officer.
An example of an act that would not be considered in the scope
of employment under the proposed addition would be if the same
recruitment officer in Turner assaulted the women outside any re-
cruitment context. The officer would not be committing the tort as a
result of job-created control and authority even if he had done it
while he was on duty and even in uniform. Therefore, no liability
would attach under respondeat superior.
By implementing the proposed change, the hypothetical day
care center would clearly be held liable for the tortious conduct of its
teacher. The sexual molestation was performed with the facilitation
of the job-created control and authority over children. In contrast,
218. Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 123 Cal. App. 3d 133, 139, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 287, 289 (1981). The proposed change is denoted with bold face type.
219. The phrase "job-created control and authority" is used to denote that control and
authority which the employee enjoys as a result of his employment. It may typically be visible
in a badge, gun and uniform in the case of a police officer. However, it could only be apparent
relative to the position the employee enjoys, for example, a teacher's apparent authority and
control over children in the classroom.
220. 494 So. 2d 1292 (La. Ct. App. 1986). See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying
text.
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the center would not be held liable under the doctrine for any acts
performed by the same teacher not required by the employer, not
incident to the teacher's duties, not performed with the exercise of
job-created control and authority, and not foreseeable.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has traced the development of the respondeat
superior doctrine, beginning with the early stages of its development
and ending with the present state of the law in California. The two-
prong test which has emerged as the prevailing judicial mode of
analysis has been discussed in detail. Furthermore the inconsistency
that results from different courts' application of the test to nearly
identical fact patterns has been demonstrated.
It is evident that the present test needs amendment in order to
add clarity to an apparently murky area of the law. The amended
test proposed in this Comment not only provides this needed clarity
and uniformity, but it also ensures that the risks and burdens inci-
dent to a particular enterprise are carried by those who reap the
benefits of that same enterprise.
The proposed change in the language will not result in a great
increase in employer liability under the doctrine. Employers will not
be liable for any tort committed by their employees, but only those
that are committed through the exercise of job-created control and
authority.
Those employers that would be affected by the proposed change
would only be those who entrust in their employees a large amount
of control and authority in order to carry out their employment du-
ties. The employers, and society as a whole, benefit from the vesting
of this authority. It is only just that those who enjoy the benefits also
bear the burden.
Christine W. Young
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